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Sharīʿah appraisal on the issue
of imposing burden of proof
to the entrepreneur in
trust based contracts
Asmadi Mohamed Naim, Mohd Noor Habibi Hj Long,
Mahyuddin Abu Bakar and Muhammad Nasri Md Hussain
Islamic Business School, Universiti Utara Malaysia, Kedah, Malaysia
Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the Shariah view on the legitimacy of requiring the
entrepreneur to prove that he/she has complied with all business requirements in case the actual profit
was below the expected profit in trust-based contracts such as mudarabah and musharakah.
Design/methodology/approach – This paper is part of the research which applies qualitative
research approaches, including among others, content analysis, interviews, observations and
descriptive analysis using fiqh muqaran (comparative analysis of jurists’ arguments) in few phases.
Findings – The study found that shifting the burden of proof to the fiduciary is the weightier view and
necessary to ensure that both sides are protected. The considerations of protecting people’s wealth (hifẓ
amwāl al-nās) and mitigating widespread greed (tamaʿ) are among the reasons for allowing elements
such as ʿurf, tuhmah and dalālat al-hāl to be treated as bayyinah in trust-based contracts when the
fiduciary is obliged to defend himself from litigation.
Research limitations/implications – The study is meant to strengthen the practices of Islamic
banks world wide.
Practical implications – Few protections can be applied for capital provider.
Social implications – This study is meant to give solution in dealing with moral hazard of both
parties, and to provide solution to the regulator for policy drafting and to increase confidence to the
industry.
Originality/value – The finding is important in assisting the regulators in drafting the policy to
protect both parties without neglecting the essence of trust-based contracts.
Keywords Burden of proof mudārabah taʿaddī taqsīr trust based contracts
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
In the wake of the vast development of Islamic finance over the past few decades, much
has been said about the limited track record of Islamic financial institutions (IFIs)
applying risk-sharing principles, especially mudārabah and mushārakah. The issues of
high risk in general and multi-faceted business risks in particular that are associated
with mudārabah and mushārakah remain obstacles to their implementation. To
minimize those risks, scholars have suggested a few steps such as proper guidelines on
The article is part of the research project from the Research Grant of International Syariah
Research Academy (ISRA research grant) and completed in 2014.
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taqsīr (negligence) and taʿaddī (transgression). Discussion of the concepts of taqsīr,
taʿaddī, guarantee and the management of moral hazard in mudārabah and mushārakah
products is paramount in realizing their implementation.
One major problem with the profit- and loss-sharing (PLS) contracts that has been
frequently mentioned in the literature is the agency problem, which is said to be inherent
to these types of contracts. For example, in the words of the State Bank of Pakistan
(2008), “The agency problem is one of the major factors for the reluctance on the part of
banks to undertake equity based modes of financing, as it gives entrepreneurs the
incentive to under-state profits.” (Kazarian, 1993; Rickwood and Murinde, 2002; Dār and
Presley, 2000; Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005).
Hashim and Hussain (2011)[1], after noting the moral hazard of customers reporting
loses in their financial statements to avoid paying the rabb al-māl, suggested that IFIs in
mudārabah and mushārakah arrangements may require customers to prove their
integrity to protect the IFIs’ position. Part of the due diligence process when applying for
mudārabah financing involves feasibility studies. Financing will not be approved
unless the proposed project is determined to have a good probability of being profitable.
The occurrence of loss raises the very real possibility that the customer was negligent.
Hence, such customers have a responsibility to prove that they are not guilty.
However, this view seems to contradict the stance of Sharīʿah from a few aspects.
First, the Islamic legal maxim states: al-asl barā’at al-dhimmah (freedom from liability is
the pre-existing and, therefore, prevailing state). Second, mudārabah is a trust-based
contract; the entrepreneur holds the capital provider’s fund under the principle of trust.
Requiring the entrepreneur to prove his innocence means that he is presumed guilty
unless he provides evidence to the contrary, which may contradict the essence of the
mudārabah contract.
All of this highlights the need to analyse the issues in detail to develop suitable
solutions for the Islamic finance industry.
The objective of this study is to examine the Sharīʿah view on the legitimacy of
requiring the entrepreneur to prove that he/she has complied with all business
requirements in case the actual profit was below the expected profit in trust-based
contracts such as mudārabah and mushārakah.
This paper is part of the research which applies qualitative research approaches,
including among others, content analysis, interviews, observations and descriptive
analysis using fiqh muqāran (comparative analysis of jurists’ arguments).
In the first phase, the study collected data from libraries in the form of appropriate
books, journals and other publications, and from recognized internet websites that
discuss some of the issues related to the research objectives: inter alia, Islamic principles
and concepts related to Islamic law and standards and guidelines on finance and the
banking industry.
The researchers also engaged in various industry talks to further understand the
subjects of the study.
In the second phase, the researchers interviewed five Sharīʿah advisors to know their
views on the discussed matters for other objectives of this research. Effort was then
made to determine which of their views is the most preferable. According to Sosulski
and Lawrence (2008), a population is selected because they are considered good sources
of information that will advance a study towards a reasonable goal. This method entails








































population to meet specific study objectives. The sample size is not a concern, as Robson
(2002) noted that there is no set number of interviews needed for a flexible design study.
Face-to-face interviews were meant to seek and thoroughly discuss the practices and
issues regarding the matter under discussion. The respondents were selected by using
snowball and purposive sampling techniques (Silverman, 2000; Neuman, 2003). Every
interview was conducted for approximately 90 minutes, and each was recorded and
transcribed for analysis. However, this article was not referred to those interviews in
which it depended mainly to document analysis and industry consultation.
2. Literature review
Hassan and Dicle (2008) said that mudārabah contains many risks, particularly
business risks. They insisted that managing a business has its own risks and that
Islamic banks need to face these risks. Among other risks inherent to mudārabah are the
business partner’s freedom to terminate the partnership at any time, which will
definitely cause the business to be liquidated because no one can be forced to continue a
partnership against his/her will. Given this reality, many Islamic banks avoid
unnecessary exposure to mudārabah risk.
However, a few studies revealed that some anxieties, such as the withdrawal of
investors, have been overcome through the existing structure of the mudārabah
contract, based on the decisions of the Accounting and Auditing Organization for
Islamic Finance Institutions (AAOIFI, 2010) as stated in Sharīʿah Standard 2010,
Standard 13, Section 4, which affirms that the mudārabah contract is not binding (ghayr
lāzim) and that each contracting party is free to withdraw except in two situations:
(1) The mudārib has started the work; as soon as that happens, the mudārabah
becomes binding until the occurrence of liquidation (tandīd), either actual
(haqīqī) or constructive (hukmī).
(2) If the two sides have agreed to stipulate a term for the mudārabah, it cannot be
dissolved before the due date except with the consent of both parties.
If an Islamic bank enters into a partnership in which the managing partner cannot be
held responsible for any operational losses, it means the Islamic bank cannot
collateralize the risk. Therefore, the mudārabah structure of equity finance becomes
riskier for the Islamic banks. In fact, it is listed as the fifth risky type of financing in
terms of credit risk (Khan and Ahmed, 2001). Moreover, Islamic banks as financial
intermediaries have to undertake the process of project evaluation, which is very long
and costly. The expertise that is needed for the decision process is complicated.
Several authors have come up with a number of solutions to make PLS contracts
more appealing to IFIs. Bacha (1997) proposed that the mudārib must “reimburse” the
rabb al-māl in the event of certain outcomes. Karim (2000) recommended that the
mudārib contribute some capital or collateral in the project. Adnan and Muhammadin
(2008) (Obaidullah and Latiff, 2008) argued that while cases of mudārib negligence
leading to losses are taken care of in mudārabah, proper systems should evolve to
establish such negligence and ascribe the losses to the mudārib. Khan (2003) suggested
that banks guarantee investment deposits by tabarruʿ to minimize the agency problem.
A few papers were presented on this topic at the Fifth Regional Sharīʿah Scholars
Dialogue in Phuket, Thailand, in 2011. Hashim and Hussain (2011) emphasized that the







































opinion. However, they said that stipulating a guarantee in mudārabah using the same
basis as in the imposition of liability on artisans and on those offering their labour to the
general public (tadmīn al-sunnāʿ and al-ajīr al-mushtarak) seems acceptable to protect
public interest (maslahah ʿāmmah) against the loss of wealth, especially in a time when
dishonesty has become typical behaviour.
Reflecting on the view above, this study observes that the guarantee element in both
issues, i.e. tadmīn al-sunnāʿ and al-ajīr al-mushtarak, does not change the nature of either
contract. Each is inclined to be categorized as damān al-yad (liability due to possession)
or damān al-mutlafāt (indemnity for damage). Therefore, the guarantee should be
allowed in both cases, as no element of qard and ribā appears in them. However, the case
is different in a mudārabah contract, as the arrangement in mudārabah is providing
money against a portion of the profit. Therefore, any guarantee element shall transform
the contract into a qard contract. Hence, the guarantee element has changed the essential
nature of mudārabah (muqtadā al-ʿaqd). Therefore, any measures to protect the
investors (rabb al-māl) should observe these matters. Steps in that direction are still
possible as long as the efforts do not exceed the boundaries of mudārabah’s essential
nature.
Hashim and Hussain (2011, pp. 16-17) then suggested that mudārabah contracts with
small and medium industries should be treated on the basis that they are liable for the
capital in the event of loss unless they are able to prove that they were free from any
negligence or irregularities in the management of the capital. The authors then gave the
justifications for this view and suggested maintaining the original rules of mudārabah
for strong companies.
This research is of the view that the nature (muqtadā) of mudārabah has been
changed to damān when the losses are placed directly on the entrepreneur. Whenever
the nature of mudārabah has been shifted to a guarantee-based contract, the rabb al-māl
is permitted to take collateral against any loss. In addition, the nature of mudārabah
becomes similar to qard. Furthermore, the entrepreneurs then have to fight to prove
their innocence. Another issue that may arise is to whom they have to prove it. This
needs to be proven in court, which consumes a lot of time and money. Assigning the rabb
al-māl the right to determine wrongdoing is hardly likely to result in an objective and
impartial judgment. Notwithstanding these complications, this research is interested in
the idea of developing an instrument to enable the rabb al-māl to get compensation if
entrepreneur negligence and misconduct do occur.
Abdul Karim (2011) also emphasizes the element of security or collateral in
mudārabah financing as practiced by Islamic banks in Indonesia. In their
implementations, the mudārabah contract is maintained as a trust contract, but the
financier (bank) is allowed to impose collateral against any customer negligence or
misconduct.
This practice is supported by AAOIFI in Sharīʿah Standard No. 13, Section 6, which
allows the placement of such securities by stating:
The capital provider is permitted to obtain guarantees from the mudārib that are adequate and
enforceable on condition that the capital provider will not enforce these guarantees except in
cases of misconduct, negligence or breach of contract on the part of the mudārib.
However, Abdul Karim did not mention when the collateral will be used to claim








































compensate the capital provider regarding the negligence or misconduct of the
entrepreneur, or are there cases where they liquidate the collateral against losses not
resulting from negligence and misconduct?
Furthermore, who will determine that the entrepreneurs have committed negligence
and misconduct in their actions? Can the bank alone decide on the matter? If the bank is
the only party that can determine whether entrepreneurs have committed negligence or
misconduct, is it fair to customers to have their fates determined by the financiers? Who
then will examine the moral hazard of the financier (rabb al-māl) determining customers’
negligence?
2.1 The problem of capital and muqtadā al-ʿaqd
Hassan and Abdul Rahman (2011), like Hashim and Hussein (2011), have chosen the
majority view of scholars that does not allow the element of guarantee in trust-based
contracts such as mudārabah and mushārakah, except if there is an element of taʿaddī
and taqsīr. However, the authors raised several other issues that could be classified as
controversial.
Hassan and Abdul Rahman (2011) cited the views of some contemporary scholars
about the types of taʿaddī; for example, Hussein Hamid and Abdul Hamid al-Ba’li
proposed that if that mudārib has done feasibility studies and the investment results
differ from the projections contained therein, the mudārib should be considered to have
committed negligence and misconduct in his operations. In addition, the case can be
analogized with the case of al-taghrīr bi al-fiʿl (deceiving by deeds). Here, as in Hashim
and Hussain’s view, it is the responsibility of the mudārib to prove that the failure to
achieve profitability as in the feasibility studies is not because of his negligence.
The view of Hussein Hamid and al-Ba’li places too much weight on the feasibility
study as a criterion for honesty, equating honesty with profit and dishonesty with loss.
Interviews with the entrepreneurs showed that the feasibility study is not a primary
factor of success or a very reliable predictor of it. On the other hand, the view of Hashim
and Hussain may be more suitable to protect the capital owner.
Hassan and Abdul Rahman (2011) also appeared to agree with Hussein Hamid in
allowing liability for taʿaddī to cover submission of all the mudārabah assets to the rabb
al-māl even if the mudārabah assets exceed the capital costs. This view is intended to
prevent the mudārib from committing taʿaddī in situations in which the value of the
assets rise during the course of the mudārabah venture, which may motivate him to
liquidate the mudārabah assets, return the capital back to the rabb al-māl and pocket the
difference.
However, this view does not recognize the increased value of company properties as
a profit that reflects the mudārib’s good management through smart investment
strategies. Therefore, it is more preferable if both parties should share accordingly any
amount above the capital amount. Furthermore, this view may not be feasible in
mushārakah in which the IFI provides part of the working capital that is used to bear the
operating costs. In this kind of mushārakah, the determination of profit is settled after
calculating the overall profit of the company’s operations. In the event of taʿaddī, the
mushārik seems to be a guarantor and liable to repay the investment by surrendering all
of the company’s assets. It seems unfair to the mushārik when mushārakah puts







































Hassan and Abdul Rahman (2011) stressed that some past scholars such as
al-Shawkānī and Ibn Taymiyyah and recent scholars such as NazihḤammād allow the
stipulation of damān upon the mudārib or mushārik. This study humbly offers a
contrasting view from that of Hassan and Abdul Rahman (2011) in their interpretation
of Ibn Taymiyyah’s view, which they understand to support the permissibility of
holding the mudārib or the mushārik liable. The differing interpretations of Ibn
Taymiyyah’s (2001) statements will be discussed in detail in Section 3.4.1 on the
essential nature of mudārabah.
Although Ḥammād (2011) also upheld the non-guarantee element in mudārabah, he
inclined towards shifting the burden of proof in disputes over profit shortfalls to the
entrepreneur (mudārib), i.e. he would have to prove that he had not been negligent and
had not engaged in misconduct:
Based on what was discussed, the weightier opinion, in my view, is the permissibility of
stipulating liability (damān) on fiduciaries (umanā’). It is valid and binding as long as the
stipulation does not empty the trust contract [of its content] and strip it of its true nature
(Hassan and Abdul Rahman, 2011).
A few writers before Ḥammād explored mudārabah and mushārakah contracts. For
instance, Usmani (2005, pp. 38-40) discussed in detail current Islamic finance practices,
including mudārabah and mushārakah. He called attention to the element of capital
guarantee in mushārakah mutanāqisah as presenting a possible issue of Sharīʿah
non-compliance in the arrangement.
ʿAbd al-Muttālib (2005) also explored mudārabah and mushārakah contracts and
related them to the practices of IFIs. A few elements of his explanation may help in the
present discussion.
Al-Khuwaytir (1999) discussed mudārabah in his book using the normal method of
comparative fiqh study without any relation to Islamic finance. Perhaps, this was
because Islamic finance was still a relatively new phenomenon at that time. However, he
did touch upon a few relevant issues related to this study, such as the nature of the
mudārabah contract, the capital contribution, negligence and misconduct.
Al-Dabb (1998) explored mudārabah within the scope of Islamic economics. He
compared the view of the Sharīʿah on mudārabah with the existing law of his country,
Jordan. He too elaborated a few issues relevant to this study.
A number of studies have explored the issues of damān, taqsīr and taʿaddī in some
detail. Ahmad (2009) touched upon the issues of tafrīṭ, ifrāt and taʿaddī and the
consequence of those acts, including damān.
Al-ʿAnzī (2009) wrote clearly and systematically about compensation conditions in
contracts. He discussed taqsīr and taʿaddī as well as the ways to compensate for those
acts.
Al-Khafīf (1981) wrote a valuable book on damān in Islamic jurisprudence. He
differentiated between contracts whose nature is guarantee and situations where a
partner is liable (dāmin) because of his acts without transforming the contract into a
guarantee-based contract.
To conclude the literature review, based on the discussion above, there are certain
issues that do not require further debate, such as the following:
1. jurists’ views on mudārabah and mushārakah; and








































However, a brief discussion of these topics is still relevant for maintaining an orderly
presentation of the concept under discussion. After analyzing the works cited, it is very
clear that a few topics require further discussion; for example:
• issues related to muqtadā al-ʿaqd in mudārabah and mushārakah;
• types of actions that can be considered from an Islamic point of view as taqsīr or
taʿaddī;
• elements of security and guarantee in mudārabah and mushārakah that are
permissible as long as they do not change the essence of mudārabah and
mushārakah; and
• the contention that placing the burden of proof on the mudārib or mushārik does
not transform the mudārabah or mushārakah into a guarantee-based contract.
3. The essential nature of partnership contracts
The subject of muqtadā al-ʿaqd (the essential nature of the contract) remains relevant as
scholars disputed in determining the permanent elements of a contract. One scholar may
say that the non-guarantee basis is an untouchable element in the partnership contract,
while others may reject such a sweeping generalization. Therefore, a reasonably
thorough discussion is needed to explore the essence of mudārabah and mushārakah
and discover the elements of muqtadā al-ʿaqd for both contracts.
This section focuses the discussion on definitions of mudārabah and mushārakah,
comparing and contrasting them, identifying the roles of the entrepreneur in mudārabah
and the partner (sharīk or mushārik) in mushārakah, the types of mudārabah and
mushārakah, the features of mudārabah and mushārakah which relate to the essence of
the contracts, the contracting parties, the capital, the loss-sharing element, management
of the fund and enhancement of the contracts.
3.1 Definitions of mudārabah and mushārakah
3.1.1 Mudārabah. Mudārabah is derived from the Arabic word “darb” which, when used
in the phrase “darb fī al-ard”, means to travel on the earth for trade or business (Ibn
Manẓūr, 2016, p. 545).
The qur’ān mentions the root word with this meaning in Sūrah al-Muzammil, verse 20:
[…] and others traveling throughout the land seeking of the bounty of Allah […]
As a technical term, Ḥanafī and Ḥanbalī scholars have defined the mudārabah contract as
follows (Al-Marghīnānī, 2016, 4/200; Ibn Qudāmah, 2016, 5/134; Al-Baghdādī, 1999, p. 303):
A contract for partnership in profit using the capital of one party and the efforts of the other.
Mālikī and Shāfiʿī scholars defined mudārabah as (Khalīl, 2016, 6/203; Al-Bujayrimī,
1996, 3/537]:
Authorization to conduct trade using cash turned over to the entrepreneur against a portion of
the profit when it becomes known.
The Mālikīs and Shāfiʿīs preferred to use the term tawkīl (authorization or appointment
of an agent) in their definition, whereas theḤanafīs andḤanbalīs inclined towards using







































this contract as a variant or manifestation of the wakālah (agency) contract and saw the
elements of the agency contract to be more relevant than the partnership elements.
On the other hand, the Ḥanafī and Ḥanbalī Schools have used the term ishtirāk
(participation), which suits their practice of discussing this contract under the rubric of
the mushārakah contract, and they classified it as sharikat Al-ʿinān (Ibn Qudāmah, 2016,
5/134, Al-Kāsānī, 2000, 5/112).
Ibn Qudāmah (2016, 5/136) says:
[Mudārabah] follows the rule of shirkat al-ʿinān in that anything permissible for the partner to
do is permissible for the entrepreneur to do, and anything prohibited for the partner is
prohibited for the entrepreneur.
However, although they did not refer to agency in the definition, the Ḥanafī; School
agreed that the meaning of wakālah still remains as the essence of contract in
mudārabah, as Al-Kāsānī (2000, 5/112) states:
[The condition of validity] related to the contracting parties – i.e. the capital owner and the
entrepreneur – is the legal capacity to appoint an agent or to act as an agent because the
entrepreneur acts according to the instructions of the capital owner, which is the meaning of
agency.
One contemporary writer, Ismail (2010), summarized the components of mudārabah and
classified this kind of contract as a partnership in profit, joint venture in which one party
provides capital and the other party provides managerial skill and labour. Hence,
according to Al-Zaylaʿī (1313H, 5/52) in Tabyīn al-Ḥaqā’iq, mudārabah is profit-sharing
in which both parties share the profit, though the capital is taken from the capital owner
alone and the work is done by the entrepreneur alone. The provider of the capital is
called rabb al-māl or sāhib al-māl, while the provider of skill and labour is called the
mudārib (Ismail, 2010).
Any profit from the business will be shared according to a pre-agreed
profit-sharing ratio. If there is a loss, the capital provider will absorb the loss,
whereas the entrepreneur will lose all the effort and time put into the business. But
if it was proven that the entrepreneur was negligent in conducting the business, he
will have to bear the loss.
Another terminological difference is that theḤanafī and theḤanbalī Schools call this
partnership mudārabah, whereas the Shāfiʿī and the Mālikī Schools call it muqāradah,
which is derived from the Arabic word qard, meaning “loan”. The technical meaning of
qard is surrender of right over capital by the owner to the user, as a charitable act and
not to obtain profit but with the stipulation that the original amount be returned to its
owner. A linguistic variant of muqāradah is qirād (Al-Bayjurī, 1999, 2/37,38).
According to Abu Saud (1976), both words, mudārabah and qirād, are used to signify
the same idea, which is to give somebody out of your capital a part to trade in, provided
that the profit is shared between both of you or that an apportioned shared of profit is
allocated to him accordingly. The active partner is called a dārib [sic] because he is the
one who travels and trades. It is also possible for both the capital provider and the active
partner to be called mudārib or muqārid, as both share the profits with each other.
3.1.2 Mushārakah. Al-Bayjurī (1999, 1/734), a Shāfiʿī scholar, defines mushārakah or
shirkah as follows:








































The Ḥanbalī scholar Ibn Qudāmah (2016, 5/109) says:
It is sharing in entitlement or in disposal.
Both of these definitions avoid restricting them to contractual acts, as the partnership in
mushārakah is not necessarily derived from a contract; it may result from other causes
such as inheritance, a gift and charity.
Ḥanafī scholars such as al-Marghīnānī and Al-Kāsānī preferred not to define shirkah,
as they directly divided shirkah into two types: shirkat al-milk and shirkat al-ʿaqd
(Al-Marghīnānī, 2016, 3/5; Al-Kāsānī, 2000, 5/73). A similar approach can be seen in
Mālikī books such as Bidāyat al-Mujtahid (Ibn Rushd al-Ḥafīd, 1995, 2/203).
There is a consensus of opinion among the jurists of all schools (including Ḥanafīs,
Mālikīs, Shāfiʿīs and Ḥanbalīs) that mushārakah is a valid and legitimate contract in
Islam; however, they dispute regarding the types of permissible mushārakah contracts.
This will be discussed in a coming subtopic (Usmani, 2005, p. 82, 2003, pp. 249-255).
3.2 Types of mudārabah and mushārakah contracts
The mudārabah contract can be categorized into two types: restricted (muqayyadah) and
unrestricted (mutlaqah) (Al-Marghīnānī, 2016, 4/201). According to Ismail (2010),
restricted mudārabah is defined as a contract in which the rabb al-māl restricts the
actions of the mudārib to a specified period and/or location or to a particular type of
business that the rabb al-māl considers appropriate, but not in a manner that would
unduly constrain the mudārib in his operations. Unrestricted mudārabah may be
defined as a type in which the rabb al-māl permits the mudārib to manage the
mudārabah fund without any restriction.
If the finance provider stipulates restrictions in the contract and the mudārib agrees
to them, then he is bound by the terms he has agreed to Ayub (2007). In unrestricted
mudārabah, the rabb al-māl has left it up to the mudārib to undertake any business he
wishes; hence, the mudārib is authorized to invest the funds as he deems fit. However,
the contracting parties may mutually agree to change the type of mudārabah that they
entered into to another type of mudārabah at any point of time.
Jurists have used a different set of considerations in their categorization of the
mushārakah contract. According to the Ḥanafīs and the Ḥanbalīs, the two main types
are shirkat al-ʿaqd (plural: al-ʿuqūd) and shirkat al-milk (plural: al-amlāk) (Al-Kāsānī,
2000, 4/73; Ibn Qudāmah, 2016, 5/109; Naim, 2011). This categorization is of paramount
importance because the consequences and rulings of the two categories differ from one
another. Shirkat al-milk is joint ownership on a non-contractual basis, while shirkat
al-ʿuqūd is contractual partnership.
They further divide shirkat al-milk into two types (Al-Kāsānī, 2000, 4/74-75):
(1) Shirkat al-milk al-ikhtiyārī (discretionary joint ownership). It is co-ownership of
an asset resulting from the decision of two or more parties to jointly purchase it.
It could also result from a gift to the partners during the lifetime of the donor or
by a bequest, which transfers its ownership after the donor’s death, or from a
charitable donation. If they accept the gift or the bequest or the donation, they
become partners in the asset without any contractual partnership.
(2) Non-discretionary shirkat al-milk is joint ownership that occurs without the
partners’ willingness playing any role. It is a result of automatic inheritance







































The Mālikīs categorized shirkah into three categories:
(1) shirkat al-irth (partnership because of inheritance);
(2) shirkat al-ghanīmah (partnership amongst the soldiers of an army regarding
property captured from the enemy); and
(3) shirkat al-mubtāʿīn (partnership among purchasers).
Shirkah al-mubtāʿīn as elaborated by the Mālikīs is similar to shirkat al-milk as discussed
by theḤanafīs and theḤanbalīs, although the Mālikīs separated the partnership due to
inheritance from the partnership due to purchase (Al-Kāsānī, 2000, 4/73; Ibn Rushd
al-Ḥafīd, 1995, 2/203,206; Ibn Qudāmah, 2016, 5/109; Al-Jazīrī, 2001, pp. 654-661).
In contrast, the tendency of most Shāfiʿī scholars in their treatment of partnership is
to limit their discussion to the permissibility of shirkat al-ʿinān without any reference to
shirkat al-milk (Al-Kāsānī, 2000, 4/73; Ibn Rushd al-Ḥafīd, 1995, 2/203,206; Ibn
Qudāmah, 2016, 5/109, Al-Jazīrī, 2001, pp. 654-661; Naim, 2011).
3.2.1 Shirkat al-ʿuqūd (contractual partnership). Shirkat al-ʿuqūd can be considered a
proper partnership because the concerned parties have willingly entered into a
contractual agreement for joint investment and the sharing of profits and risks. The
Ḥanafī and Ḥanbalī scholars subdivided this kind of shirkah into four different types
(Al-Kāsānī, 2000, 4/73; Ibn Rushd al-Ḥafīd, 1995, 2/203,206; Ibn Qudāmah, 2016, 5/109):
(1) A. Al-ʿinān (restricted authority and obligation): Al-ʿinān is a contract where two
or more parties agree to share their capital and efforts in a business. The shares
in the profit and loss from the business must be determined at the beginning of
the contract. Al-ʿinān implies that the partners need not all be adults, nor must
they have an equal share in the capital. Likewise, they are not necessarily equally
responsible for the management of the business. Accordingly, their share in the
profits may be unequal, but this must be clearly specified in the partnership
contract. On the other hand, their share in the losses would be proportional to
each partner’s capital contribution.
(2) Al-mufāwa dah (full authority and obligation): In the case of mufāwa dah, the
partners are adults and are equal in their capital contribution, their ability to
undertake responsibility and their share of profits and losses. Each has full
authority to act on behalf of the others, and they are jointly and severally
responsible for the liabilities of their partnership business, provided that
such liabilities have been incurred in the ordinary course of business
activities.
(3) Al-abdān (labour, skill and management): Al-abdān is a contract among partners to
share their efforts in a business and share the profit of the business according to
pre-agreed portions before the commencement of the contract. Normally they agree
to contribute their skills and efforts to the management of the business without
contributing to the capital. For instance, in a project to tailour clothing, the partners
jointly contribute their skill in tailouring and receiving their pre-agreed ratio of the
profit at the end of the business.
(4) Al-wujūh (reputation and creditworthiness): Shirkat al-wujūh is a contract between
partners to purchase goods on credit and sell them for cash or by installments with








































pre-agreed ratios. The partners in shirkat al-wujūh use their creditworthiness to
acquire working capital; they do not contribute their own capital, normally because
they do not possess any.
3.2.2 Discussion of shirkat al-milk and the common requirements of mushārakah. In
examining shirkat al-milk, the Ḥanafīs discussed a number of issues such as the use of
the asset by one party in the absence of the other owners; the sale of one partner’s
ownership share to other partners or to a third party; and the status of the asset and the
permissibility of selling it if it is on another party’s land, e.g. a building on leased land
(Al-Jazīrī, 2001, pp. 654-655).
The Mālikīs enumerated a number of issues, inter alia, ways to resolve the
problem when the sleeping partner of jointly owned property declines the active
partner’s request to use the asset; how the active partner deals with certain
circumstances; the right of each partner to protect his or her asset; and how they can
ensure that their asset is protected physically or constructively during its use
(Al-Jazīrī, 2001, pp. 657-658).
The Ḥanafīs deliberated two main conditions for common shirkah (including shirkat
al-milk) as follows (Al-Jazīrī, 2001, p. 662):
(1) The subject matter of shirkah must be amenable to disposal under an agency
(wakālah) contract.
(2) The profit must be pre-determined by ratio or percentage. Shirkah is void if there
was no pre-determined ratio or if the profit of one of the partners is
pre-determined as a fixed amount such as $1000.
Actually, the second condition was meant for contractual partnership (shirkat
al-ʿaqd) rather than shirkat al-milk. Profit in shirkat al-milk should be equal to the
partners’ portions in the partnership. No further discussion on shirkat al-milk was
found in the Mālikī and Ḥanbalī literature. By understanding these requirements,
this study will be able to analyse the practices of mushārakah in the existing Islamic
finance industry.
3.3 The nature of trust-based contracts and the burden of proof in facing moral
hazard
Let us call to mind a few of the main issues mentioned in previous sub-sections:
• The rabb al-māl in mudārabah should bear the investment risk to legally justify
his entitlement to a share of the profit. The entrepreneur (mudārib) is not liable for
the profit or the capital of the investment. It is allowed for a guarantee to be
provided by a third party.
• Scholars disagree about the liability of the borrower in the gratuitous loan of a
tangible asset (ʿāriyah) in case it is lost.
• The original rule of ijārah is that the lessee is not liable. However, a few scholars
have agreed that the consideration of protecting people’s rights from greed has
become a reason for allowing damān in ijārah, as was practiced by ʿUmar, as long
as no element of ribā arises from this kind of damān, especially in imposing
liability on manufacturers and artisans (Al-Kāsānī, 2000, 4/72; Ibn Qudāmah,







































Putting the burden of proof on the fiduciary (mudārib, agent, lessee and borrower) to
provide the details of their activities may minimize moral hazard. But is this approach in
line with the teachings of the Sharīʿah? Scholars have different views regarding this
matter.
3.3.1 The first view. The majority of scholars are of the view that fiduciaries are free
from damān in trust-based contracts until proven otherwise. Therefore, in determining
taqsīr and taʿaddī, the original rule is to uphold the fiduciary’s declaration. Thus,
whenever he declares that the loss resulted from normal business activities without any
negligence or misconduct, the capital owner must accept his explanation unless he has
evidence to prove otherwise. This view is derived from the interpretation of certain
hadīths and Islamic maxims.
The principle that people are free from any obligation until proven otherwise
Al-Shawkānī (1998, 2/680) defined istishāb as follows:
Whatever has been established in the past, the presumptive rule is that it remains so into the
future.
Investors and principals only entrust a fiduciary to conduct business through
mudārabah or mushārakah or fee-based agency after they have accepted that he is
trustworthy. Hence, no one should accuse him without any evidence, as the presumptive
rule is that one is innocent until proven guilty, as stated in the Islamic legal maxim
(Al-Zarqā, 1998, p. 105):
Freedom from liability is the pre-existing and therefore prevailing state.
Therefore, it is not admissible to treat the fiduciary as guilty before submitting proof to
demonstrate his guilt.
Accusation must come with evidence.




[Providing] positive proof is the obligation of the plaintiff while the oath is for the defendant
Al-Suyūtī (1983, pp. 508-509) explained the maxim and its implications by positing a
situation where the accuser swears that the accused is guilty but has no evidence. If the
accused swears an oath to deny the claim, he is considered innocent. If he declines the
oath, there are two opinions about what happens next in property claims. Some scholars
require the plaintiff to swear an oath to become entitled, while some hold that the
plaintiff becomes automatically entitled. According to Al-Zarqā (1998, p. 369), the
wisdom of this hadīth is that the accuser’s claim is weak in the absence of evidence
because it conflicts with the apparent facts; i.e. in property claims, the accuser is
claiming ownership rights to an asset in the physical possession of another, and
possession is normally a corollary of ownership. Therefore, this accusation needs strong
evidence to support and strengthen his weak position. That is the role of the bayyinah
(testimony or physical evidence). On the other hand, the accused is in a strong position
because the starting rule is to presume him free of liability. Therefore, swearing an oath
is sufficient to maintain his strong position.
A fiduciary in a trust-based contract is in a very strong position because he is
presumed innocent in the face of accusations against him. Thus, the accuser must








































carelessly. Placing a burden on the accused to prove his innocence conflicts with the
textual evidence and the legal maxim.
3.3.2 The second view. Ḥammād and a few contemporary scholars are of the view
that the burden of proof should be placed on the fiduciary because the fund providers
and principals are not in a position to know what was done by the entrepreneur or agent
in conducting the business. If such a rule is not imposed, fiduciaries can proceed freely
without any obligation to disclose their conduct or to be held accountable. These
scholars cite the following evidence to support their argument:
3.3.2.1 Al-ʿurf (standard practice). The custom of people in previous days was to
accept the declaration of fiduciaries that what they had been entrusted with was lost
or impaired without any negligence or misconduct on the fiduciary’s part. People
accepted such declarations in mu dārabah, ijārah and wakālah for a fee. Those who
challenged such declarations were required to provide evidence as per the hadīth
cited above.
However, current custom differs. Regulators routinely require business entities,
especially financial institutions, to provide financial statements in which they disclose
such information as total assets, deposits and collateral. They are also required to
disclose their investment activities and measures taken to protect customers’ deposits.
Moreover, such institutions are subject to audits from time to time.
In case losses occur, the regulator requests complete disclosure to find any
irregularities in the management process. In the event that an institution fails to disclose
what is required of it, the regulators have the power to fine it or suspend or cancel its
license. The requirements imposed by the regulators have definitely succeeded in
garnering people’s confidence in the system. Hence, they have no qualms about leaving
their money on deposit in financial institutions.
Therefore, in cases of loss or impairment of capital or the loss of an item in
trust-based contracts, especially in exchange contracts such as mudārabah,
mushārakah, ijārah and wakālah bi al-ajr, the custom has shifted to require the fiduciary
to prove that everything was in order before incurring the loss or impairment.
Consideration of the change of custom is in line with the views of many scholars; for
example:
The author of Miyārah al-Fās (Al-Mālikī, 2000, 2/43) said:
When two people dispute, and the first party’s claim is consistent with the presumptive rule
while the claim of the other party is at variance with it, the weightier claim is that which is
consistent with the presumptive rule unless an operative custom has become entrenched
regarding the subject of the claim that is at variance with the presumptive rule. In that case the
dictates of the operative custom will turn the claim which is at variance with the presumptive
rule into the [new] default position [i.e. he will be considered the defendant].
Al-Tawīdī (in ḤAmmād, 2011, p. 34) Mentioned:
That is because whenever a practice has become common on a certain matter, it becomes the
basis of the presumptive rule since the jurists identify the presumptive rule with that which is
widespread and predominant.
Ibn Shās expressed a similar view (in Ḥammād, 2011, p. 34):
When one of the litigants claims a matter opposed to the common practice (ʿurf), and the other
party claims a matter congruent with the common practice, the first party is the plaintiff







































The view of the Ḥanbalīs (in Ḥammād, 2011, p. 34):
The declarations of fiduciaries (umanā’) are accepted in transactions and impairment as long
as they do not contradict customary practice.
Al-Zarkashī (1405H, 1/312) stated about this matter:
[ […] on the condition] that there is no widespread practice that conflicts with the presumptive
rule. Whenever standard practice does that, it shall certainly be given priority.
Jaʿīṭ (2016, pp. 43-44) said:
A number of definitions have been mentioned for the plaintiff (muddaʿī) and defendant
(muddaʿā alayhi). The most accurate is that the plaintiff is the one whose position is not
supported by either the presumptive rule or common practice while the defendant is supported
by one of them. If the presumptive rule supports one of them while standard practice supports
the other, the one supported by standard practice is the defendant.
As discussed earlier, the common practice of financial institutions is to disclose to the
regulator that they did not have any irregularities in their practices. Hence, the burden
of proof has become standard practice in the industry. Therefore, burden of proof can be
considered as the original rule in financial dealing in commercial transactions with an
intrinsic element of liability and also in trust-based commercial transactions.
3.3.2.2 Tuhmah (the strong potential for hiding actual facts). Tuhmah, which literally
means suspicion or insinuation, refers to the strong possibility that the fiduciary is being
dishonest about what happened in the matter with which he was entrusted, i.e. he has a
strong motive to cover up any negligence or misconduct on his part. This psychological
reality is cited as a compelling reason to shift the burden of proof from the capital owner
to the fiduciary.
A number of scholars have raised this issue, even though they agreed that the
original rule is that a fiduciary is presumed innocent of any accusation and free of any
liability unless evidence is provided to establish his guilt. For instance, in the Mālikī
discussions of ʿāriyah and rahn, they differentiated between items that can be concealed
(mā yughāb ʿalayhi) and those that cannot (mā lā yughāb ʿalayhi) (Ibn Rushd al-Ḥafīd,
1995, 2/255; Al-Jazīrī, 2001, p. 773). According to them, for items that cannot be
concealed, such as property and animals, no liability to replace or to pay the value
should be imposed on the borrower in the event of loss or damage. However,
the borrower is liable for an item that can be concealed unless he has a proof to show that
the loss did not result from his act. Thus, they already upheld the concept of tuhmah.
On the other hand, as for the case of al-ajīr al-mushtarak, the act of ʿUmar ibn
al-Khaṭṭāb showed that he considered the element of tuhmah when he imposed a rule
that al-ajīr al-mushtarak (those who provide labour services to the general public) are
responsible for the loss of materials entrusted to them. The basis for the rule was to
protect people’s property from greed. ʿUmar’s approach was adopted by the Ḥanafī
School and was upheld in one view of the Shāfiʿī School and of the Ḥanbalī School
(Al-Kāsānī, 2000: 4/72; Ibn Qudāmah, 2016, 6/106; Al-Jazīrī, 2001, p. 698). The basis of the
suspicion here is greed, and it became a reason for allowing the damān in ijārah (a labour
lease) as long as no element of ribā arose from this kind of damān.
The practice of some scholars, which originated with some Companions of Prophet
Muhammad (peace be upon him), shows that the element of tuhmah is sufficient to shift








































3.3.2.3 Maslahah Al-Ghazālī (2016, 1/286-287) defined maslahah as that which
protects the objectives of Islamic law (maqsūd al-Sharʿ), which he identified as centring
on five aspects of human life. They are protection of their religion, their lives, intellects,
dignity and lineage and wealth. Anything that plays a role in protecting these five is
considered maslahah, and anything that endangers them is harmful.
Ibn Rushd al-Ḥafīd (1995, 2/187) stressed that damān is imposed for two reasons:
taʿaddī and for public benefit (maslahah) of protect people’s wealth (hifẓ al-amwāl).
Those who impose liability on this kind of contract have no textual evidence for doing
so; only maslahah and preventing the evil consequences of what appear to be legal acts
(sadd al-dharīʿah). Therefore, shifting the burden of proof depends, among other things,
on the concept of maslahah, istihsān and sadd al-dharīʿah. It is meant to ensure that the
occurrence of loss or impairment was due to causes other than negligence or misconduct.
Thus, both sides are protected by this step.
3.3.2.4 Dalālat al-hāl (circumstantial evidence or market reality) Dalālat al-hāl refers
to a marked divergence between the achievement of the particular project and that of
similar projects in the market. Many scholars have mentioned the possibility of using
this kind of evidence. Al-Sawī stated (1995, 7/706):
The entrepreneur is a trustee; thus his word is accepted in claims that the asset has been
damaged, or claims of loss, or [his claim] that he returned it to its owner, on the condition that
he swears an oath for any such claim and as long as there is no circumstantial evidence or
testimony that he is lying. The circumstantial evidence could come from asking businessmen
of that locality whether trade in that asset at that particular time resulted in losses, to which
they reply, “We know of no losses from trading in that particular asset.”
Hence, if similar ventures in a particular industry succeed, it is argued to be sufficient
evidence that the venture in question should have succeeded. If it didn’t, then the
entrepreneur has to prove his innocence.
Al-Bājī (2016, 5/164) made a similar point:
If the entrepreneur claims the business suffered a loss, and his claim is reasonable in that those
who travelled as he did or undertook a similar business to his experienced the same, the claim
is acceptable and he is to be believed. However, if he claimed losses that are not corroborated
[by comparable experience], Ibn Ayman narrated from Mālik that he is liable.
Al-Bājī’s statement clearly shows the relation between claims, market conditions and
the experiences of similar ventures. Hence, if a claim diverges from the market reality,
the trustee should be held liable.
Al-Dardīr (2016, 3/536) upheld a similar view:
The claim of the entrepreneur is accepted in declaring the total or partial destruction [of the assets]
because the capital provider already accepted him as a fiduciary, even though he may not actually
be trustworthy. This is in case there is no circumstantial evidence that he is lying. If such evidence
is produced, then he is held liable. The same holds for his claim that the capital has been lost, if he
swears an oath to it, even if he is not accused, according to the well known opinion [of the madhhab],
unless there is circumstantial evidence that he is lying.
One contemporary understanding of the meaning of circumstantial evidence as
discussed above is feasibility studies, as they provide comprehensive projections of
the potential rewards and risks of ventures. Such a study would analyze the
marketplace to determine whether it is economically practical and desirable to







































identifies whether a defined market or trade area desires the proposed goods or
services. A market study, for example, would determine the demand for a real estate
development of a certain type in a certain location; a feasibility study would
determine whether that demand is willing to pay what the project will cost plus a
profit (Hashim and Hussain, 2011, p. 16).
3.4 Discussion of both views
It can be observed that the second view does not reject the basic principle upon which the
first view is based, i.e. that persons should be considered free from any liability and
obligation until proven otherwise; however, it tempers it on the basis of considerable
evidence showing the debased state of current society and the inclinations of the average
individual. Those considerations make it more appropriate to uphold that the trustee
should prove that he is innocent. Its proponents argue that this view is consistent with
the following maxim (Al-Zarqā, 1998, p. 227):
Evolution of Sharīʿah rulings [based on custom and ijtihād] due to changing times is not to be
denied.
On the other hand, the first view upholds the importance of evidence (bayyinah) in accord
with the texts that stipulate its necessity. Perceptions of circumstances of dishonesty are
not at par with evidence in Islamic law. Therefore, it is not accurate to bring such
perceptions as evidence to support the position of the capital provider or the owner of a
leased asset.
Notwithstanding this argument, this study inclines towards the second view because
of the evidence from secondary sources (i.e. ʿurf, tuhmah and maslahah) and an analysis
of the reality of the current time and place. Furthermore, many scholars have stressed
the potential that existing practice, physical evidence and feasibility studies have to
become the basis for the presumptive rule in certain matters. Therefore, it is acceptable
that fiduciaries in trust-based exchange contracts be required to disclose their practices
in ordinary circumstances and even more so in extraordinary situations leading to
losses or impairment of others’ assets.
3.5 Government prerogatives regarding ʿuqūd al-amānāt
It is accepted by almost all scholars that the government or the regulator has the
authority to take measures for the purpose of protecting the society at large. Such acts
fall under the rubric of siyāsah sharʿiyyah, as mentioned by Al-Zarqā (2004, 1/137):
Siyāsah sharʿiyyah comprises the acts of the authority which bring the people closer to
salutariness and further from corruption, even if the Prophet (peace be upon him) did not do
them and no revelation [specifically] mentioned them, as long as they do not contradict what
has been mentioned by the Sharīʿah.
The statement above is congruent with the following maxim mentioned by Al-Suyūtī
(1983, p. 121):
The acts of the ruler that affect the public must be based on their interest.
Al-Suyūtī stressed al-Mawardi’s view that the ruler is prohibited from inducing people
to do reprehensible (makrūh) acts. Hence, for a government to encourage or pressure its
citizens to commit prohibited (harām) acts has an even greater right to be prohibited








































Moreover, as discussed before, the essence of both the mudārabah and the
mushārakah contract is to venture and face risk to be entitled to the profit. To eliminate
the risk element of the contract for one of the parties will definitely change the nature of
these contracts to be at par with a loan contract and, hence, trigger the prohibition of
ribā. Therefore, any interference by the government to change the contract into a
non-trust contract and make the entrepreneur liable under whatever circumstances that
result in losses and impairment is tantamount to converting the contracts into loan
contracts with interest. Such interference is prohibited in Sharīʿah, as it contradicts the
essence of both contracts.
However, it is permissible to interfere in these contracts by shifting the burden of
proof to the fiduciary because of a variety of evidence recognized by the Sharīʿah. Doing
so falls under siyāsah sharʿiyyah and the implementation of the abovementioned maxim.
As for other trust-based contracts such as ʿāriyah and the like that have an exchange
(muʿāwadah) element – for example, labour leases (ijārat al-ashkhāṣ), agency for a fee
(wakālah bi al-ajr) and pledge (rahn) – a group of scholars agreed to consider the nature
of the contracts to become ʿuqūd al-damānāt as long as they do not contain any element
of ribā, as discussed previously. Therefore, it is a permissible for government
prerogative to impose such damān upon this category of contracts, and shifting the
burden of proof in them is definitely permissible.
In a nutshell, the differences between shifting the burden of proof and changing such
contracts into contracts in which liability is an intrinsic element can be understood as
follows:
(1) Shifting the burden of proof onto the entrepreneur or the agent working for a fee
in the event of loss or impairment has these characteristics:
• Giving the capital provider the right to fair disclosure is related to damān
yad rather than damān ʿaqd, i.e. it is not imposed by the contract itself but,
rather, by the possession of another person’s property. In the event that
the entrepreneur refuses to provide proper disclosure, the court or
arbitrator has the right to liquidate the collateral on the basis of
negligence. Hence, the consequence of non-disclosure is not directly
related to the contract.
• The stipulation does not transform the contract into yad damānah as
occurred in damān ʿaqd.
• The stipulation is an act of verification (tathabbut) that protects both
parties.
• The reality of the low degree of religiosity in current society must be
taken into account.
(2) In contrast, transforming the status of the entrepreneur to the bearer of
liability by stipulating it in the contract has these characteristics:
• It contradicts the muqtadā al-ʿaqd (the essential nature of a trust contract).
• It places the entrepreneur in the position of guarantor whenever a loss occurs
unless he is able to provide information to avert this default ruling. The effect
of this position is direct in cases where the capital owner is in a position to
liquidate the collateral without any interference from a third party.








































In conclusion, shifting the burden of proof to the fiduciary is the weightier view and
necessary to ensure that both sides are protected. The considerations of protecting
people’s wealth (hifẓ amwāl al-nās) and mitigating widespread greed (tamaʿ) are among
the reasons for allowing elements such as ʿurf, tuhmah and dalālat al-hāl to be treated as
bayyinah in trust-based contracts when the fiduciary is obliged to defend himself from
litigation.
This study suggests three ways to ensure justice for both sides:
(1) The regulator is permitted to require the entrepreneur to prove that he has not
committed any misconduct or negligence in managing the business. If he fails to
provide proper disclosure, the capital provider has the right to liquidate the
collateral or ask for reimbursement of the capital. This kind of liquidation should
be reported to the regulator from time to time as a control mechanism. In the
event of a dispute between the two parties regarding the adequacy of
the disclosure, they should agree to refer to an arbitrator, with the court being the
last resort.
(2) The feasibility study can be considered as dalālat al-hāl or circumstantial
evidence for the viability of the venture. The combination of the feasibility study
and ʿurf should be considered on a par with ordinary evidence (i.e. the testimony
of witnesses) for prosecuting the entrepreneur for negligence or misconduct;
however, it is up to a court or an arbitration body to determine whether or not the
entrepreneur is guilty.
(3) It is permissible for the capital provider to stipulate that the entrepreneur should
prove that he is free from any misconduct in the event of loss as such a
stipulation is not tantamount to a capital guarantee and not in contradiction with
the muqtadā al-ʿaqd of the mudārabah and mushārakah contracts. It is only a
means to mitigate the possibility of moral hazard and asymmetric information.
Nevertheless, the decision that the entrepreneur committed negligence or
misconduct should be determined by an independent third party.
It should be noted that shifting the burden of proof is not meant to change the nature of
trust-based contracts into damānah. It is only a means to ensure full disclosure from the
entrepreneur, and the capital provider has no right to set off the amount against the
collateral prior to verifying that the entrepreneur has not disclosed the required
information. To control the practice of capital providers vis-à-vis collateral, the study
proposes that any liquidation of collateral of a mudārabah or mushārakah venture
should be reported to the regulators and endorsed by them.
Note
1. This study is part of commissioned research by International Syariah Research Academy
(ISRA) of Islamic Finance of the Central Bank of Malaysia (BNM) and was required to revisit
the idea by those writers who presented their papers in the ISRA 2012 muzakarah
programme. Therefore, it is compulsory to review all previous literatures and previous
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Al-Suyūtī, Jalāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Rahmān (1983), Al-Ashbāh wa al-Naẓā’ir, Dār al-Kutub
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Ibn Manẓūr, Muhammad ibn Mukarram al-Afrīqī (2016), Lisān al-ʿArab, Dār Sadir, Beirut.
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Jaʿīṭ, Muhammad al-ʿAzīz (2016), Al-Ṭarīqah al-Mardiyah fī al-Ij̄arāt al-Sharʿiyyah ʿala Mazhab
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